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Abstract 
 
Current methods in the shipping industry to evaluate performance do not account for differences 
in fleet profiles of registries such as age, size or ship type and not for bad luck. This can lead to 
unfair evaluation of enforcement efforts of the international standards. Furthermore, incentives to 
improve performance are concentrated on decreasing detentions rather than incidents. This 
article proposes a new method to a longstanding problem to evaluate performance that rectifies 
shortcomings of the method currently used. The proposed method measures the enforcement 
effort by means of proxy variables and introduces incentives for improvement that go beyond the 
currently used ‘detention’. The aim is to provide a fair and transparent way. The proposed 
method is applied and results are compared with methods currently used to demonstrate how the 
rankings change. The method can be adapted to other areas of the shipping industry such as 
classification societies or ship management companies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The shipping industry is characterized by a complex legislative framework of over 50 
conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which lacks enforcement powers 
due to its international nature. Since enforcement at the flag state level is not directly monitored, 
port states have created port state control regimes (PSC) that enforce internationally agreed 
standards on vessels entering their territory, by exercising their right to perform PSC inspections. 
If a vessel is found to be not compliant, it can be detained. Two PSC regimes (the Paris MoU and 
the Tokyo MoU) publish each year a list of flags according to their performance during 
inspections, the so-called Black/Grey/White List (BGW-list), where black listed flags perform 
worst. The Paris MoU covers the European Union, parts of Canada and the Russian Federation 
while the Tokyo MoU covers Asia, Australia, Chile and parts of the Russian Federation. The list 
has become the industry standard and is often interpreted as a rank of list according to flag 
performance. 
 
It has been a longstanding problem to find a better method to measure the performance of 
registries. Perepelkin et al. [1] have proposed a method that deals with some of the shortcomings 
of the current method, giving a common criterion. Indeed, the criterion used at the moment is 
defined in terms of the excess factor, the value of which depends on the BGW-list and for each 
of the three, black/grey/white, it is defined by a different procedure (Perepelkin et al. [1]). 
Perepelkin et al. [1] have considered incident data and deficiencies besides the current standard 
of using detention data.  
 
Given this situation, this article builds on some aspects of the method developed by Perepelkin et 
al. [1], and in particular it tries to address the lack of any common criterion that depicts the effort 
of a flag. The proposed method introduces the concept of and indirect measure denoted the 
‘enforcement effort’ which cannot be directly observed. The number of undesirable events is 
counted that are the result of insufficient effort such as weighted numbers of detainments, very 
serious accidents and serious accidents. The outcome is taken as a proxy for the effort of a 
registry. The method can be extended in the future to include other quantities that can measure 
enforcement effort or implementation effort. Data from the Member States audit scheme of the 
International Maritime Organization might perhaps be useful to integrate in the future. 
 
In principle, other factors might also be relevant, such as the age of the vessel and the sizes or the 
ship type, as these have an influence on the safety quality of ships (Bijwaard and Knapp [2]). 
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The reason for this is that the major shipping markets have different characteristics. These 
differences are due to the varying commercial conditions of the shipping markets and are best 
reflected by ship types. Ship types are not considered in methods currently used to measure 
performance. Moreover, it is also difficult to evaluate a registry with a small fleet fairly by 
means of currently used methods. One reason for this is that for small fleet, the performance is 
more prone to bad luck. Therefore, the concept of `sympathy’ is introduced into the measure, 
giving each flag the benefit of the doubt, but not more. Registries with smaller fleets get more 
sympathy, as desired.  
 
The proposed method also addresses the lack of use of combined data sources (Knapp [3], 
Knapp and Franses [4], Bijwaard and Knapp [2]) such as combined inspection data or incident 
data to provide a more complete picture of the enforcement effort. The use of incident data is 
also extended to include two degrees of seriousness – very serious and serious incidents.  
 
The challenge is to find a method to measure enforcement effort of international standards, 
providing leniency to registries that have smaller fleets or that have more challenging fleet 
profiles. The second challenge is to provide fair incentives to improve. It is reasonable to expect 
that in case of sufficient effort by a flag, for the ships under this flag, certain undesirable events 
will be rare. For example, then inspections of ships will rarely lead to detention, and very serious 
incidents will be rare. This suggests to count some well-chosen types of undesirable events, 
detentions and very serious accidents, and to use the outcome as a performance measurement 
that is proxy for the effort: a low respectively high outcome is interpreted as a good respectively 
inadequate effort by the flag. 
 
The method is applied and results are compared with methods developed by Perepelkin et al. [1] 
and with the excess factor methods currently used by the industry in order to demonstrate how 
the ranking of flags changes by introducing the ‘enforcement effort’ and ‘sympathy’ to registries 
with smaller fleet or with more challenging fleet profiles. 
 
The proposed method is not restricted to the use of registries but could be extended to recognized 
organizations (RO) or Document of Compliance Companies or any other agent where the 
principal cannot be directly observe the effort, but only certain undesirable events that must be 
ascribed to a mixture of chance and inadequate effort, that is, in many moral hazard problem (see 
Laffont and Martimort [5] for this type of problem).  
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2. Derivation of proposed method 
 
2.1.General concept 
 
The development of the alternative method starts with the introduction of two numbers for each 
flag ܨ, ݀ி  , the quotient of the proportion of inspections of vessels under flag ܨ that lead to 
detention and this proportion for all vessels, and  ݖி, the quotient of the proportion of the vessels 
under flag ܨ that has been involved in a very serious accident and this proportion for all vessels. 
Thus, one gets that for ݀ி, as well as for ݖி, the value 1 is a benchmark. For example,  ݖி is 
smaller, respectively larger, than 1 precisely if the proportion of vessels under flag F that has 
been involved in a very serious accident is smaller, respectively larger, than this proportion for 
all flags.	 It follows that the of two flags is compared, ܨଵ and  ܨଶ , for which 	݀ிభ ൒ 	݀ிమ  and 
ݖிభ ൒ 	 ݖிమ: in this case, one considers that the effort of  ܨଶ is at least as good as that of  ܨଵ.  
 
This idea is now extended in order to able to compare the effort for each pair of flags. To this 
end, a weight factor c is introduced which is to be chosen by policy makers. As such, one can 
consider that the effort of  ܨଶ is at least as good as that of  ܨଵ precisely if  ݀ிభ ൅ ܿݖிభ ൒ 	݀ிమ ൅
ܿݖிమ.  That is, a first attempt is made for measuring the performance of a flag ܨ: 
 
					ܳி′ ൌ ݀ி ൅ ܿݖி                                                                     `crude performance measure’ (1) 
 
The lower this number is, the better the effort of the flag to enforce standards. This measure is a 
combination of inspections, detentions, very serious incidents and fleet size. Note that for a flag 
with an average number of detentions and very serious accidents, the performance measure is 
1+c.  
 
There are two other types of undesirable events that could be considered as well. There is the 
deficiency information from PSC inspections, and there is the number of accidents or incidents. 
Deficiency information is used in the Perepelkin et al. [1]. The proposed method does not 
include deficiencies since detention information covers the main aspects of the undesirable event 
associated with inspections. In addition, there are about 400 different types of deficiencies which 
have to be grouped and weighted by policy makers according to their importance which is in 
essence captured by detention. For this reason, the method is extended to include two types of 
incidents, extending the use of very serious incidents from Perepelkin et. al. [1]. This will 
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provide three levels of seriousness of undesirable events – detentions, serious and very serious 
incidents. In theory, this could be extended with other information such as outcomes of audits 
from the member states audit scheme of the International Maritime Organization in the future.  
 
 
2.2. Introduction of ship types as proxy to different fleet profiles 
 
In order to better quantify the effort of a flag, the method distinguishes between ship types based 
on Knapp [3] as follows: 1) general cargo, 2) dry bulk carrier, 3) container vessel, 4) tankers, 5) 
passenger vessels and 6) all other ship types. Other reasons for taking ship type into account are 
that ship types can also be used as a proxy for other factors such as age or size (refer to Table 1). 
Some registries administer a fleet of older ships of high risk ship types such as general cargo 
vessels (Knapp [3], Knapp [6], Knapp et al.[7], ) which tend to engage in more regional trade 
compared to for instance large tankers, container vessels or dry bulk carriers. Monitoring a fleet 
of older ships engaged in local trade is more challenging than monitoring for instance a fleet of 
young tankers. Nevertheless, the same effort will lead on average (refer to Table 1) to a higher 
detention rate.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics ship types (2006 to 2008) 
Age GRT Deficiencies Detention Incident rate 
Ship type Mean Mean Mean rate (very serious) 
General cargo 18.7 9,326 4.08 7.0% 0.0031 
Dry bulk carriers 14.4 31,462 2.82 4.0% 0.0021 
Container ships 9.7 33,885 1.79 1.8% 0.0020 
Tankers 10.1 29,959 1.85 2.3% 0.0009 
Passenger ships 18.9 33,626 3.00 2.4% 0.0020 
Other ship types 20.8 4,315 3.96 8.1% 0.0099 
 
The first improvement to the crude formula 					ܳி′	 ൌ ݀ி ൅ ܿݖி for measuring the performance 
of a flag ܨ is made by making a small change: that is the different ship takes are accounted for 
and this gives the following improved formula for measuring the performance of a flag ܨ:  
ܳி ൌ ଵேಷ ∑ ሺߙ௧ ∗௧ఢி ܦ௧,ிሻ ൅	
஼
ேೞ೓೔೛ೞ	ಷ
∑ ሺߚ௧ ∗௧ఢி ܼ௧,ிሻ                ` finer performance measure’ (2) 
where: 
ܨ: a flag, 
ܳி: the performance measure of flag ܨ; 
ிܰ:	 the number of inspections of ships under flag ܨ during the period under consideration; 
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௦ܰ௛௜௣௦	ி: the number of ships under flag	ܨ, averaged over the period under consideration; 
c: a positive constant, to be chosen by policymakers, that gives the weight of a very serious 
casualty compared to a detention; 
ݐ ∶ a type of ship,  determined by age and tonnage group; 
tϵܨ: shorthand notation for `the types of ship that occur among the ships under flag	ܨ’; 
ܦ௧,ி : the number of detentions of ships of type ݐ  under flag ܨ  during the period under 
consideration; 
ܼ௧,ி: the number of very serious incidents of ships of type ݐ under flag ܨ during the period under  
consideration; 
The coefficients ߙ௧  and ߚ௧  in the formula above are calculated with the following formulas: 
ߙ௧ ൌ ே೟஽೟  provided  ܦ௧	is	not	zero, where ܦ௧ is the number of detentions of ships of type ݐ of all 
flags during the period under consideration, and ௧ܰ is the number of inspections of ships of type 
ݐ of all flags during the period under consideration; if ܦ௧ ൌ 0, then we put	ߙ௧ ൌ 0	, for example 
(it does not matter what we put here, as in the summation ߙ௧ is multiplied with	ܦ௧,ி, which is 
zero if ܦ௧ ൌ 0ሻ. 
ߚ௧ ൌ ேೞ೓೔೛ೞ೟௓೟ 	 if ܼ௧  is not zero, where ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧ is the number of ships of type ݐ of all flags during 
the period under consideration,  and where ܼ௧ is the number of very serious incidents of ships of 
type ݐ for  all flags, during  the period under  consideration;  if ܼ௧ ൌ 0 , then we put ߚ௧ ൌ 0, for 
example (with a similar justification as given above for ߙ௧ሻ. Including serious incidents as well, 
we obtain the following formula: 
ܳி ൌ ଵேಷ ∑ ሺߙ௧ ∗௧ఢி ܦ௧,ிሻ ൅	
஼
ேೞ೓೔೛ೞ	ಷ
∑ ሺߚ௧ ∗௧ఢி ܼ௧,ி)	൅	 ௗேೞ೓೔೛ೞ	ಷ ∑ ሺߓ௧ ∗௧ఢி ܵ௧,ி)                            (3) 
where: 
d: a positive constant, to be chosen by policymakers, that gives the weight of a serious casualty 
compared to a detention; 
ߓ௧ ൌ ேೞ೓೔೛ೞ೟ௌ 	 if ܵ௧  is not zero, where ܵ௧ is the number of  serious incidents of ships of type ݐ for  
all flags, during  the period under  consideration;  if ܵ௧ ൌ 0 , then we put ߓ௧ ൌ 0, for example 
(with a similar justification as given above for ߙ௧ሻ. 
ܵ௧,ி : the number of serious incidents of ships of type ݐ under flag ܨ during the period under  
consideration. 
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The reason for the chosen correction for detentions is as follows: without corrections for ship 
types, one would take for the contribution of the detentions to the measure of the performance of 
flag F, the ratio	஽ಷேಷ, where ܦி  is the number of detentions of ships under flag F. This can be 
written as ଵேಷ ∑ ܦ௧,ி௧ఢி . To make the numbers of detentions comparable between different types, 
it is reasonable to multiply, for each type t, the term ܦ௧,ி by	ߙ௧ ൌ ே೟஽೟ , the average number of 
inspections for one detention for ships of type t. This gives the contribution ଵேಷ ∑ ሺߙ௧ ∗௧ఢி ܦ௧,ிሻ	 to 
the measure of the enforcement effort of flag F. In particular, this will make the contribution of 
the detentions of old ships smaller, as desired. The reason for the chosen correction for very 
serious (and serious) incidents is the same. In particular, for a flag that has an average number of 
detentions and very serious incidents, the enforcement effort will be 1+c. For the variant that 
takes serious incidents into account, this is 1+c+d.  
 
 
2.3. Adaptation for small fleet sizes 
 
The finer measure of the performance of a flag given above, ܳி, is not an adequate measure for 
the performance of flags with a small fleet. The numbers ܦ௧,ி and ܼ௧,ி are subject to chance, they 
are stochasts, and for small fleet the effect of chance on the outcomes (for example, `bad luck’), 
and so on the outcome of the formula, can be unacceptably large. Ideally one would like to 
replace in the formula the random variables by their expectations, but these are unknown. 
Therefore Appendix A presents a systematic method to replace the numbers ܦ௧,ி  and ܼ௧,ி  by 
numbers that are slightly smaller, just enough to make sure, within a certain precision, that these 
numbers are smaller than the expectations of these random variables. This makes the outcome of 
the formula smaller, and so a flag is certain not to be given by bad luck a performance measure 
ܳி that is higher than deserved; to be more precise: it is very unlikely that this will happen. That 
is, the qualities of the flags are attributed with some sympathy, `the benefit of the doubt’.  We 
will see that this systematic way accords more sympathy to flags with a small fleet than to flags 
with a larger fleet, as desired. Thus the shortcoming of the finer performance measure above will 
have been repaired. For the precise formula and the derivation and justification for it, please refer 
to Appendix A. 
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3. Application of proposed method and improvement incentive 
This article applies and compares three methods as follows: 1) the current excess factor method 
(EF) used by the Paris MoU, 2) the method proposed by Perepelkin et al. [1] and 3) the proposed 
new method with the incorporation of the enforcement effort and sympathy. Two variations of 
undesirable events are considered – that is very serious incidents only, and both incident 
categories. This article does not mention the name of individual flags due to the political nature 
of the subject matter. The main interest lies in applying the proposed method and in 
demonstrating how the ranks of the flags change by applying the different methods rather than 
producing a list to ‘name and shame’ of registries.  
 
The terminology currently used such as Black/Grey/White is replaced by an alternative grouping 
which better describes the safety quality of vessels of companies and which in turn is reflected 
by the enforcement effort of a registry. It is also proposed that the values are determined every 
three to five years in order to give registries the opportunity to demonstrate improvement. The 
categories as follows: 
 the worst quartile according to Q-ranking is called high risk (proxy to low effort); this 
corresponds according to experts reasonably well to substandard performance of a flag; 
 the second worst quartile is called medium risk (proxy to medium effort);  
 the best two quartiles are called low risk (proxy to high effort). 
 
The proposed grouping goes beyond the idea of targeting substandard ships for inspection since 
the undesirable events include three categories with different degrees of seriousness. The method 
is applied to data from 2006 to 2008 of 183 thousand inspections, 8,646 detentions from the 
Paris MoU, the USCG, the Indian Ocean MoU and the Vina del Mar Agreement, although 
inspection data are not available for each of these regimes for the entire time period. The data is 
further complemented with incident data from Knapp [6] from four sources (IHS-Maritime, 
Lloyds List Intelligence Services, International Maritime Organization and the Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority). For the classification of seriousness, internationally agreed 
definitions of IMO [8] are used and very serious (524) and serious (3,883) incidents are 
considered. The incident data needed to be manually reclassified in order to ensure compatibility 
of the four sources. Since fleet data was not entirely available for the entire time period by major 
ship types, estimates of the number of ships for each ship type and flag was used. The relevant 
ship types used were general cargo, dry bulk, container, tanker, passenger vessels and other ship 
types. The input data for the method is listed below: 
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 Total number of inspections by ship type and flag 
 Total number of detentions by ship type and flag 
 Total number of very serious and total number of serious incidents by ship type and flag 
 Total number of vessels in service by ship type for each flag 
 A weight factor for c  for very serious incidents and a weight factor ݀ for serious 
incident, relative to detention, to be determined by policy makers 
 
In order to be able to make comparisons across the methods, registries that can be compared 
across all methods are chosen – that is flags with a minimum sample size of 30 inspections 
(based on the currently used for the EF method). From a total of 132 flags, one can evaluate 99 
flags across all three methods. There are many different variations one could compare but for the 
sake of demonstration, the following four combinations are considered: 
 Current excess factor method where only detentions are considered 
 Method based on Perepelkin et al.[1] where detentions and very serious incidents are 
considered with weight factors c=4 and c=5 respectively 
 The proposed new method with information by ship type for detentions and very serious 
incidents with weight factors c=4 and c=5 respectively 
 The proposed new method with information by ship type for detentions, very serious and 
serious incidents with weight factors c=4 and d=2 and for c=5 and d= 3 for very 
serious/serious incidents respectively 
 
 
4. Discussion of results 
 
The combinations above are applied and the flags are ranked best to worst (1 meaning best and 
99 meaning worst rank or least effort). The first comparison relates to the EF method with each 
of the combinations and different weight factors c (very serious incidents) and d (serious 
incidents) to see how the ranks change and a series of graphs are presented in Appendix B for 
easy comparison. On can observe some agreement compared to the method in current use but 
also large changes in rank for a number of flags. The change in ranks reflects the effect of 
incorporating incidents (either serious or very serious) compared to detentions or deficiencies 
only. At least 20 flags with change of up to 50 ranks are identified. 
The change of ranks of the new proposed method compared to the EF method can further be 
explained by the incorporation of the ship types, which accounts for the differences in the fleet 
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profiles. This is because, more `sympathy’ is provided tor maritime administrations that register 
for instance older general cargo ships or have varying fleet profiles in general. To provide more 
insight into this, Table 2 provides the values for the three parameters – alpha, beta and gamma 
for each ship type based on the sample data used (given in equation 3 earlier). 
 
Table 2: Weight factors for leniency by ship type 
Ship type ࢻ࢚ ࢼ࢚ ࢽ࢚ 
general cargo 14.45 328.78 54.14
dry bulk carriers 24.87 474.47 48.98
container ships 56.79 602.54 42.36
Tankers 44.21 1052.95 89.80
passenger ships 44.12 483.46 40.51
other ship types 20.25 95.90 21.12
 
The parameters are weight factors for detentions (ߙ௧), very serious incidents (ߚ௧) and serious 
incidents (ߛ௧ ) for a certain ship type t. The larger the weight factor ߙ௧ , the smaller is the 
probability for the ship type to be detained. This also holds for serious and very serious 
incidents. Due to the fact that very serious incidents are rare events, values of ߚ௧ are on average 
much larger than the other parameters. For small weight factor values, the proposed method will 
provide more sympathy to the registry since it will be more challenging to administer an older 
fleet (e.g. general cargo) trading in coastal areas compared to vessels that trade internationally on 
either set routes (e.g. container trade, dry bulk trades) or are inspected more often (e.g. tankers). 
Interesting to observe from Appendix B is that one can find not much difference in the effect of 
the chosen weight factors for either very serious incidents (c=4 or c=5) or serious incidents 
(d=2, d=3). Our implementation does not show many differences in the outcomes, but the fact 
that it uses more data suggests a greater reliability. Therefore it seems slightly preferable to 
implement the method taking serious accidents into account as well. One could argue that at this 
moment, the population of serious incidents is incomplete since reporting to the IMO is biased. 
This however can change in the future and with better data population, the inclusion of serious 
incidents into the formula will account better for the effort since more observations are available 
compared to very serious incidents. The proposed new method only requires one weight factor 
for each incident category, to be determined by the policy makers: the weight factor for a very 
serious incident and the weight factor for a serious incident relative to a detention. 
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Perhaps larger increases for both weights compared to detention might be more appropriate and 
could be investigated in the future. For the purpose of this article, it is suggested that policy 
makers should provide these weight factors based on expert knowledge. For the remainder of this 
analysis, two weight factors are chosen, namely c=4 for very serious and d=2 for serious 
incidents. Then the ranks are compared across these two combinations with the current excess 
factor method and with each other.  
 
The top-left picture of Figure 1 for instance, gives the points (xf, yf) for all flags f, where xf is the 
rank according to the excess factor and , yf  the rank according to the method of Perepelkin et 
al.[1] with weight factor c=f (very serious incidents only). The picture below presents the same 
but compared to the new proposed method with weight factor c=4 (very serious incidents) and 
d=2 (serious incidents). The proposed method shows more variability compared to the EF 
method than the method of Perepelkin et al. [1], which uses only very serious incidents and 
which does not make any distinction between ship types. One can also notice that there is less 
change in the new method compared to Perepelkin et al. [1]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of ranks with various methods, VS=very serious, S=serious incidents 
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The next topic of interest is to see how the risk categories change and the flags are classified 
according to their risk levels as mentioned earlier, where the worst quartile of Q is classified as 
high risk (proxy to low effort), the second worst quartile is medium risk (proxy to medium effort) 
and the remaining two quartiles are low risk flags (proxy to high effort). Appendix C provides 
selected results for the different combinations and weight factors with the changes of the risk 
categories for all flags that were evaluated. Not surprisingly by now, given Figure 1, one can 
observe many shifts from the high risk category based on the EF method to the medium or low 
risk category based on either Perepelkin et al. [1] of the new proposed method. When including 
serious incidents, one can further observe shifts of some flags from the low risk category to the 
medium risk category and vice versa, compared to the method by Perepelkin et al.[1]. 
 
Some of the shifts from high risk or medium to low risk can be explained by a combination of 
ship types – so maritime administrations with general cargo vessels were given more sympathy. 
Shifts from the low risk category to the medium risk category can be explained by very serious 
incidents on tankers and passenger vessels, and therefore receive less sympathy since in general 
it will take less effort to administer these ship types. Other shifts are simply due to the addition 
of serious incidents. Nine flags do not change across the methods and remain in the ‘high risk’ 
category irrespective of the method applied. These flags perform consistently worse even though 
their fleet profile is strongly characterized by a high proportion of general cargo vessels or in one 
case a combination of general cargo vessels and tankers. However, even if sympathy is given, 
these flags show the least effort in enforcing international standards. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This article proposes a more refined method to measure the effort of a flag to administer its fleet 
given that some registries have varying fleet profiles or take vessels into their registry that might 
be more challenging to administer (e.g. older general cargo vessels, smaller fleet profiles, etc.). 
The method is applied and results are compared against two other methods, in particular how the 
ranks of some flags change. The advantages of the new method over the other methods can be 
summarized as follows. The new method is based on one extremely simple and convincing idea: 
counting undesirable events and using this as a proxy for the effort of a flag, which cannot be 
measured directly. There is no need for policy makers to determine the many weight factors for 
various types of deficiencies as only two weight factors are needed. In this way, policy makers 
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have the possibility to fine-tune the method by choosing one (or two) weight factors. More 
information is used compared to the method currently used and so the sample bias is smaller and 
more accurately reflects reality. 
 
Distinction of ship types can be taken into account, and this is strongly desirable because of the 
impact of different market characteristics on safety. Some sympathy is given to registries with 
more challenging fleet profiles and/or small fleet; the latter are more susceptible to bad luck. For 
more challenging fleet types, this is done by distinguishing ship types. For small fleet, some 
sympathy is given to each flag to account for possible bad luck and this is done in a systematic 
way such that the sympathy given is just enough to account for possible bad luck of flags. This 
sympathy is greater for small flags, as is desired: these flags are more susceptible to bad luck. 
Although not demonstrated here, the proposed method can also evaluate flags with smaller 
sample sizes (below 30).  
 
The proposed method of counting undesirable events is very flexible and easy to implement 
practically. The flexibility is demonstrated by giving straightforward adaptations from the basic 
counting idea that take into account all issues that arise in practice and that lead to the 
shortcomings of the current excess factor method, partly addressed by the method developed by 
Perepelkin et al. [1].  
 
Based on this analysis, it is recommended that policy makers use the following undesirable 
events as proxy to determine the effort in enforcing international standards: detentions, serious 
accidents and very serious incidents. With respect to the use of serious incidents, the method will 
become more precise once better data is being populated by the IMO via the Global Integrated 
Ship Information System (GISIS). We also feel that a change in terminology from the current 
division of Black/Grey/White into High/Medium/Low Risk, where the first two groups are the 
worst two quartiles, is more appropriate. In addition, the method could be extended to include 
other information such as data from the member state audit schemes of the International 
Maritime Organization. 
 
Another recommendation is to fix the boundaries between these three groups for three years, 
based on data from the last three years (possibly use five years’ worth of data in the future), and 
to give flags the opportunity to move upward, especially from High Risk to Medium Risk, in 
order to reduce occurrence of substandard ships and improve overall safety. Finally, the method 
14 
 
should be implemented in such a way that no name-and-shame effects can arise for flags from 
changes in ranks compared to the method currently in use. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of the formula for sympathy for bad luck 
 
This technical section provides an analysis for the variation in the observations with the 
following additional notation. Let ௧ܰ,ி be the number of inspections of ships of type ݐ under flag 
ܨ during the period under consideration (∑ ሺ ௧ܰ,ி௧ఢி )ൌ 	 ிܰ), and let ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி be the total number 
of ships of type ݐ under flag	ܨ, averaged over the period under consideration (∑ ሺ ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி௧ఢி )ൌ
	 ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦ி ). Assume that the number of detentions of a certain ship type under a certain flag 
follows a binomial distribution: ܦ௧,ி~ܤ݅݊ ቀ ௧ܰ,ி, ݌ௗ௧,ிቁ,  with ݌ௗ௧,ி the underlying probability of 
detention at one inspection of ship type ݐ under the flag F. Moreover, it is assumed that the 
number of very serious incidents of ship type ݐ  under flag ܨ  also follows a binomial 
distribution	ܼ௧,ி~ܤ݅݊ሺ ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி, ݌௭௧,ிሻ, with ݌௭௧,ி  the underlying probability of a very serious 
casualty for each ship of type ݐ under flag F. The probabilities of detention or very serious 
casualties of one ship type differ among the flags because of the differences in management 
among the flags, the very effect which is the intention to measure. When ௧ܰ,ி is large enough, 
the distribution of the stochast ܦ௧,ி	approximates the normal distribution with 
 
ܧ൫ܦ௧,ி൯ ൌ ௧ܰ,ி ∗ 	݌ௗ௧,ி and	ܸܽݎ൫ܦ௧,ி൯ ൌ ௧ܰ,ி ∗ 	݌ௗ௧,ி ∗ ሺ1 െ ݌ௗ௧,ிሻ.   (1) 
 
The same holds for the distribution of the random variableܼ௧,ி: when ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி  is large enough, 
the distribution of the random variable ܼ௧,ி approximates a normal distribution, with ܧ൫	ܼ௧,ி൯ ൌ
௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி ∗ 	݌௭௧,ி and with ܸܽݎ൫ܼ௧,ி൯ ൌ ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி ∗ 	݌௭௧,ி ∗ ሺ1 െ ݌௭௧,ிሻ. It will be convenient to 
write ሺ݌ௗ௧,ிሻ′ ൌ ஽೟,ಷே೟,ಷ   and to view this as an observation of a normally distributed random 
variable with mean ݌ௗ௧,ி	 and variation	
௣೏೟,ಷሺଵି௣೏೟,ಷሻ
ே೟,ಷ 	. Similarly for ቀ݌
௭
௧,ிቁ
ᇱ ൌ ௓೟,ಷேೞ೓೔೛ೞ೟,ಷ. 
 
Ideally one would like to take as a measure for the performance of a flag: 
 
ܳி∗ ൌ ଵேಷ ∑ ሺߙ௧ ∗௧ఢி ௧ܰ,ி ∗ 	݌
ௗ
௧,ிሻ ൅	 ஼ேೞ೓೔೛ೞ	ಷ ∑ ሺߚ௧ ∗ ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி ∗ 	݌
௭
௧,ி௧ఢி ሻ		   (2) 
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This formula has been obtained from the one for ܳி	by replacing ܦ௧,ி ൌ ௧ܰ,ி ∗ ሺ݌ௗ௧,ிሻ′ by ௧ܰ,ி ∗
݌ௗ௧,ி , and by replacing ܼ௧,ி ൌ ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி ∗ ሺ݌௭௧,ிሻ′  by ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி ∗ 	݌௭௧,ி.  Unfortunately, one 
cannot observe the underlying probabilities.  
 
Therefore, systematic `lower bounds’ for these probabilities are taken (refer to Perepelkin et al. 
[1]) using a systematic way to derive these `lower bounds’. Let ݌ᇱ be the observed value of the 
random variable. Thus, ݌  stands for ݌ௗ௧,ி		 respectively 		݌௭௧,ி , and ݌ᇱ  stands for 	஽೟,ಷே೟,ಷ  
respectively		 ௓೟,ಷேೞ೓೔೛ೞ೟,ಷ. The standard deviation is	ߪ ൌ ට
௣ሺଵି௣ሻ
ே  . A confidence interval is fixed for a 
confidence level ܽ (for example, ܽ ൌ 0.95 is a popular choice) and the confidence interval	ሺ	݌ െ
ܿ௔, ݌	 ൅ ܿ௔ሻ is defined for each ݌  such that a value  ݌ᇱ of the stochast is contained in this interval 
with probability	ܽ: Prሾ|݌ᇱ െ ݌| ൏ ܿ௔ሿ ൌ ܽ. 
 
The meaning of this interval is as follows. The values of ݌	that satisfy this condition are the 
values of ݌  for which the hypothesis that ݌ᇱ  lies in the confidence interval of the normal 
distribution with mean	݌ and standard deviation	ߪ cannot be rejected with confidence level ܽ . 
To put it more simply, but not entirely precisely: one can be `sure’ that the true value of the 
underlying probability ݌ does not differ more than ܿ௔	from the observed value ݌ᇱ (here `sure’ 
means roughly that the probability that this statement is incorrect for given ݌  equals 1-	ܽሻ.	 The 
method takes ܮሺ݌ሻ, the smallest value of ݌ that satisfies this condition as the `lower bound’ of ݌. 
The reason for this terminology is that for given p , one can be confident that ܮሺ݌ሻis smaller than 
݌, given the prescribed confidence level a. Because of the fact that ݌ᇱ is normally distributed, it 
holds that: Prሾ|݌ᇱ െ ݌| ൏ ܿ௔ሿ ൌ 2 ∗ ߔ೎ೌ഑ െ 1, where ߔ is the cumulative function of the standard 
normal distribution and ߔ೎ೌ
഑
 gives the cumulative probability for ܼ ൑ ௖ೌఙ  and	ܼ~ܰ݋ݎ݉ሺ0, 1ሻ. It 
follows that: |݌ᇱ െ ݌| ൏ ߔିଵሺଵା௔ଶ ሻ	ߪ and from the above, it follows: 
|݌ᇱ െ ݌| ൏ ݐ௔ට௣ሺଵି௣ሻே  with ݐ௔ ൌ ߔିଵሺ
ଵା௔
ଶ ሻ 
ሺ݌ᇱ െ ݌ሻଶ ൏ ݐ௔ଶ ∗ ௣ሺଵି௣ሻே   
݌ᇱଶ െ 2݌ᇱ݌ ൅ ݌ଶ ൏ ௧ೌమே ݌ െ
௧ೌమ
ே ݌ଶ  
ቀ1 ൅ ௧ೌమே ቁ ݌ଶ ൅ ቀെ2݌ᇱ െ
௧ೌమ
ே ቁ ݌ ൅ ݌ᇱ
ଶ ൏ 0. 
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This is an inequality in a quadratic polynomial in	݌. As 1 ൅ ௧ೌమே , the coefficient of 	݌ଶ, is positive, 
the solutions form an open interval with endpoints the roots of the quadratic equation 
ቀ1 ൅ ௧ೌమே ቁ ݌ଶ ൅ ቀെ2݌ᇱ െ
௧ೌమ
ே ቁ ݌ ൅ ݌ᇱ
ଶ ൌ 0. 
Then, the abc-formule can be used to get the `lower bound’ for p: 
ܮሺ݌ሻ ൌ
െ൬െ2݌ᇱ െ ݐ௔ଶܰ ൰ െ ඨሺ2݌ᇱ ൅
ݐ௔ଶܰ ሻଶ െ 4 ൬1 ൅
ݐ௔ଶܰ ൰ ൫݌ᇱଶ൯
2ሺ1 ൅ ݐ௔ଶܰ ሻ
 
The other root is the ` upper bound’, denoted by ܷሺ݌ሻ. For flags with small fleet, the variation in 
the random variable ݌ᇱ  is larger. Indeed, a good measure for this variation is the difference 
ܷሺ݌ሻ െ ܮሺ݌ሻ.  As the denominator in the expression	ܮሺ݌ሻ (and	ܷሺ݌ሻ) is approximately 2, one 
can see that ሺܷሺ݌ሻ െ ܮሺ݌ሻሻଶ  is approximately ሺ2݌ᇱ ൅ ௧ೌమே ሻଶ െ 4 ቀ1 ൅
௧ೌమ
ே ቁ ൫݌ᇱ
ଶ൯.  This can be 
rewritten as ௧ೌ
ర
ேమ ൅
ଶ௣ᇲ௧ೌ
ே ሺݐ௔ െ ݌ᇱሻ. As ݐ௔ ൎ 2 (usually) and ݌ᇱ ∊ ሺ0,1ሻ, one can see that this is 
decreasing in ܰ. Thus, for flags with small fleet, the variation is large. 
 
The above is applied to the probabilities of detention and of very serious incidents. After 
simplification, the promised `lower bounds’ of probabilities of detention and very serious 
incidents for different ship type and different flags is obtained: 
ܮ ቀ݌ௗ௧,ிቁ ൌ
ܦ௧,ி
௧ܰ,ி ൅
1
2 ∗
ݐ௔ଶ
௧ܰ,ி െ ݐ௔ඨቆ
ܦ௧,ி൫ ௧ܰ,ி െ ܦ௧,ி൯
௧ܰ,ிଷ
ቇ െ 14 ∗
ݐ௔ଶ
௧ܰ,ிଶ
1 ൅ ݐ௔ଶ௧ܰ,ி
 
and 
ܮ ቀ݌௭௧,ிቁ ൌ
ܼ௧,ி
௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி
൅ 12 ∗
ݐ௔ଶ
௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி
െ ݐ௔ඩቌ
ܼ௧,ி ቀ ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி െ ܼ௧,ிቁ
௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி
ଷ ቍ െ 14 ∗
ݐ௔ଶ
௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி
ଶ
1 ൅ ݐ௔ଶ
௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி
. 
Now the correct measure for the performance measure of a flag can be obtained by replacing the 
observed value of each random variable ቀ݌ௗ௧,ிቁ
ᇱ
 (and	ቀ݌௭௧,ிቁ
ᇱ
) by the `lower bound’ ܮ ቀ݌ௗ௧,ிቁ 
(and ܮ ቀ݌௭௧,ிቁ) for the mean value of the stochast, as defined above.  
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ܮሺܳிሻ ൌ ଵேಷ ∑ ሺߙ௧ ∗௧ఢி ௧ܰ,ி ∗ 	ܮሺ݌
ௗ
௧,ிሻሻ ൅	 ௖ேೞ೓೔೛ೞ	ಷ ∑ ሺߚ௧ ∗௧ఢி ௦ܰ௛௜௣௦௧,ி ∗ 	ܮሺ݌
௭
௧,ிሻሻ (3) 
 
The `lower bound’ for ܳி		 is taken as the final performance measure for a flag ܨ.  Both 
shortcomings of the crude performance measure					ܳி′ ൌ ݀ி ൅ ܿݖி  have been overcome since 
this measure takes into account ship types and it takes into account the variations in the 
observations.  
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Appendix B: Change of ranks for each method and weight factor 
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Appendix C: Selected results by flag for each method 
 
 Current method  Perepelkin New method  New method  
 excess factor vs, c=4 vs, c=4 vs, c=4 
Flag no weights s, d=2 
Flag 1 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 2 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 3 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 4 medium risk high risk low risk low risk
Flag 5 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 6 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 7 low risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 8 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 9 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 10 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 11 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 12 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 13 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 14 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 15 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 16 medium risk low risk low risk low risk
Flag 17 low risk high risk low risk low risk 
Flag 18 low risk medium risk low risk low risk
Flag 19 medium risk high risk low risk low risk 
Flag 20 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 21 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 22 medium risk high risk low risk low risk 
Flag 23 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 24 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 25 high risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 26 medium risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 27 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 28 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 29 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 30 high risk high risk low risk low risk
Flag 31 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 32 low risk low risk low risk low risk
Flag 33 medium risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 34 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 35 high risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 36 high risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 37 low risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 38 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 39 high risk high risk medium risk low risk 
Flag 40 low risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 41 low risk low risk medium risk low risk 
Flag 42 high risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 43 high risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 44 low risk low risk low risk low risk
Flag 45 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 46 low risk medium risk medium risk low risk
Flag 47 high risk medium risk medium risk low risk 
Flag 48 low risk low risk low risk low risk 
Flag 49 low risk medium risk low risk low risk 
Flag 50 medium risk high risk medium risk low risk 
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 Current method  Perepelkin New method  New method  
 excess factor vs, c=4 vs, c=4 vs, c=4 
Flag no weights s, d=2 
Flag 51 low risk low risk low risk medium risk 
Flag 52 low risk high risk medium risk medium risk
Flag 53 low risk medium risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 54 medium risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 55 low risk low risk low risk medium risk 
Flag 56 high risk high risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 57 low risk medium risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 58 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 59 low risk medium risk low risk medium risk 
Flag 60 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 61 low risk low risk low risk medium risk 
Flag 62 medium risk low risk low risk medium risk 
Flag 63 low risk high risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 64 low risk medium risk medium risk medium risk
Flag 65 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 66 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk
Flag 67 medium risk medium risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 68 high risk high risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 69 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 70 high risk high risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 71 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 72 high risk medium risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 73 low risk low risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 74 low risk high risk medium risk medium risk 
Flag 75 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 76 medium risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 77 medium risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 78 high risk high risk high risk high risk
Flag 79 medium risk low risk high risk high risk 
Flag 80 medium risk medium risk high risk high risk
Flag 81 low risk low risk high risk high risk 
Flag 82 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 83 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 84 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 85 low risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 86 low risk low risk high risk high risk 
Flag 87 medium risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 88 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 89 low risk low risk high risk high risk 
Flag 90 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 91 low risk low risk high risk high risk 
Flag 92 high risk high risk high risk high risk
Flag 93 high risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 94 medium risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 95 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 96 high risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 97 medium risk medium risk high risk high risk 
Flag 98 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Flag 99 high risk high risk high risk high risk 
Note: vs=very serious, s=serious 
 
